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Abstract 
The present study provides a comprehensive investigation of the relationship between Openness 
and political orientation and activism in Europe. Analyses were conducted on the four waves of 
the European Social Survey, including large representative samples in up to 26 European 
countries (total N > 175,000). In line with previous studies, a robust, positive relationship 
between Openness and left-wing political orientation was obtained in Western Europe. However, 
in Eastern Europe, the relationship between Openness and political orientation was weaker, and 
reversed in three out of four waves. Moreover, Openness yielded significant positive 
relationships with unconventional activism and to a lesser degree with conventional activism. 
The magnitude of the relationship between Openness and activism was dependent on political 
orientation and region. Stronger associations between Openness and activism were found for 
those having a left-wing orientation in Western Europe, whereas in Eastern Europe, Openness 
was somewhat stronger related to activism for those having a right-wing orientation.  In the 
discussion we elaborate on the role of the geo-political context in the relationship between 
Openness and political variables.  
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The psychological basis of political preferences and attitudes has captured scholarly 
attention for many years (e.g., Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Zimbardo, 1999; Riemann, Grubich, 
Hempel, Mergl, & Richter, 1993; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 1996). These studies have consistently 
shown that high levels of Openness are linked with a left-wing (liberal) political orientation, 
whereas Closedness has been associated with a right-wing (conservative) political orientation 
(see, Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). McCrae (1996) therefore stated that: “variations in experiential 
openness are the major psychological determinant of political polarities” (p. 325). However, it 
should be noted that most studies on the relationship between Openness and political orientation 
have been conducted in stable democracies in Northern America and Western Europe and that 
only limited data are available from other political cultures, like former communist countries. 
Yet, the few notable studies in Eastern Europe (Van Hiel, Kossowska, & Mervielde, 2000; 
Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007) indicated that Openness may be differently related 
to political orientation. 
  In addition to the role of Openness in political attitudes, recent research has suggested 
that Openness may also determine the degree to which the individual acts upon his political 
beliefs, thereby advancing a relationship between Openness and political activism. Direct 
evidence for this relationship has been provided by Curtin, Stewart, and Duncan (2010) who 
focused on left-wing political activism and revealed a positive relationship with Openness, 
mediated by an increased concern with political and societal events. Pattyn, Van Hiel, Dhont, 
and Onraet (2010) reported indirect evidence on this issue, showing a negative relationship 
between Openness and Political Powerlessness. Political Powerlessness, in turn, has been related 
to low activism in the political and social domain (see, Patterson, 2002).  
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In the present study, we elaborate on the relationship between Openness and political 
orientation and activism in a comprehensive cross-cultural investigation of Western European 
countries with an established democratic system and Eastern European countries that have 
recently transformed their political system from being single-party communist states to 
politically pluralistic societies. We use the Openness (to change) versus Conservation dimension 
of Schwartz’s (1992) model of personal values as an indicator of Openness and we distinguish 
between conventional and non-conventional types of political activism. 
The relationship between Openness and political attitudes across cultures 
Ample evidence shows that people who prefer novelty, variety and intense experience (i.e. 
high levels of Openness) tend to lean towards the left-wing side of the political spectrum, whereas 
those who prefer familiarity, routine and tradition (low Openness) tend to endorse right-wing 
political views. In their meta-analytic integration of studies, Sibley and Duckitt (2008) concluded 
that Openness is strongly related to left- versus right-wing ideological attitudes.  
Most studies relating Openness with political orientation have used the Five-Factor Model 
of personality (FFM) Openness dimension, either in terms of Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-PI-
R model (e.g., McCrae, 1996; Riemann et al., 1993; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 1996) or in terms of 
Big-Five personality descriptive adjectives of Openness (e.g., Caprara et al., 1999; Peterson, 
Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997). Additionally, studies that used an Openness measure based on 
personal values have also substantiated its association with political orientation (e.g., Altemeyer, 
1998; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Duriez et al., 2005; 
Feather & McKee, 2008). These latter studies have generally used Schwartz’s (1992) well-
validated inventory measuring universal values. These values can be organized in a two-
dimensional taxonomy with the first dimension reflecting the opposition between Openness (to 
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change) and Conservation (see Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). Studies using this 
values inventory have demonstrated that a left-wing political orientation is associated with the 
Openness pole of the higher order value dimension (including Stimulation and Self-direction 
values), whereas a right-wing political orientation is associated with the Conservation pole (i.e., 
Security, Conformity, and Tradition values). In sum, the available evidence from both the FFM 
and the Values perspective on Openness seems to corroborate McCrae’s (1996) observation that 
an individual’s level of Openness is a major determinant of his/her political orientation.  
 However, it should be noted that most studies linking Openness to left-wing political 
orientation have been conducted in Northern America and Western Europe. A cross-cultural test 
of this relationship (Van Hiel, Kossowska, & Mervielde, 2000) revealed stronger relationships 
between Openness and left-wing orientation in Belgium (Western Europe) than in Poland 
(Eastern Europe). Thorisdottir and colleagues (2007) even demonstrated a modest positive 
relationship between Openness and a right-wing political orientation in Eastern Europe. These 
two studies therefore challenge the generalizability of previous findings and the assumption that 
Openness has a universal status as a major psychological determinant of left-wing political 
orientation (McCrae, 1996). 
A probable explanation for the divergent findings in Eastern Europe pertains to its recent 
political history. In particular, most citizens of Eastern European countries have been socialized 
in a totalitarian, left-wing ideological system (i.e., Communism). Left-wing political attitudes 
thus reflect the traditional, ‘conservative’ perspective on political and social issues, which may 
therefore be less attractive to people high in Openness, who value novelty, being unconstrained 
by tradition. However, since communism as a system collapsed in Eastern-Europe in the late 
eighties and early nineties (i.e., the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the USSR) the 
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younger generation did not experience this regime during formative (adolescent) years (see, 
Duriez et al., 2005). It is therefore plausible that a significant relationship between Openness and 
left-wing political orientation would emerge in younger Eastern Europeans, whereas no such 
relationship (or even a reversed relationship) should be expected in older generations. 
The relationship between Openness and political activism 
While research has often focused on the influence of Openness on political attitudes, 
Openness has recently been suggested to also play a role in political participation and activism. 
Curtin et al. (2010) have provided direct evidence to bear on this issue, showing higher political 
activism with increasing levels of Openness. In particular, these authors have shown that 
Openness relates positively to Personal Political Salience, a variable denoting an increased 
tendency to attach personal meaning to large-scale sociopolitical events (see, Duncan & Stewart, 
2007). Moreover, Personal Political Salience was predictive of political activism and as such 
fully mediated the relationship between Openness and political activism. In other words, because 
open people show an increased concern with political and societal events, they are more likely to 
be politically active.  
Pattyn et al. (2010) have recently shown that Openness is negatively related to Political 
Powerlessness, (i.e., the perception of having no personal input into the political decision-making 
process), Political Isolation, (i.e., the perception that one does not share political opinions with 
others), and Political Estrangement, (i.e., the perception of government as irresponsive to the 
voters’ concerns). Obviously, these political perception variables are likely to curb people’s 
tendency to engage in political activism, as revealed in previous research (especially for Political 
Powerlessness; for an overview, see Patterson, 2002). 
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In sum, Openness seems to be implicated in how people see and make sense of their 
social world. Open people examine the sociopolitical world more closely and they feel more 
personally involved and affected by it, which might increase their political participation levels. 
Two types of political activism 
Based on the idea that Openness is related to left-wing political orientation in Western 
societies, Curtin et al. (2010) assessed engagement across eight policy domains typically 
reflecting left-wing concerns: AIDS, antiwar, civil rights, environment, gay/lesbian rights, 
homelessness, prochoice, and women’s rights. However, the authors also acknowledged their 
focus on left-leaning political activism as a limitation of their study and conceded that right-
leaning activism, such as prolife activism, also aims at social change. Hence, high levels of 
Openness may be associated with activism for right-wing political ideas as well. 
To allow testing for the possibility that Openness also affects activism in right-wing 
citizens, in the present study we assess political activism without referring to specific topics (i.e., 
ideology-neutral). Rather, we distinguish between ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ forms of 
political action/participation (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991; van der Meer & van Ingen, 2009). 
Conventional activism refers to people’s efforts to influence policies through representation (i.e. 
‘party activism’) and aims to exert influence within the boundaries of the electoral system, for 
example by contacting politicians, working for a political party, or wearing a campaign badge. 
Unconventional political activism, on the other hand, represents attempts to influence the 
political system ‘from the outside’ by, for example, participating in demonstrations, signing 
petitions, or boycotting products. Especially in the context of Openness based activism, the 
distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ might be meaningful. Indeed, 
conventional or party activism works through support for and reliance on established political 
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agents and ideas, whereas unconventional activism is not restricted to existing ideas and 
structures, which we assume to be more appealing to open individuals. We therefore hypothesize 
that Openness is particularly associated with unconventional activism, whereas the relationship 
with conventional activism may be less outspoken.  
The present study 
The present cross-national study aims to delineate the relationships of Openness with 
political orientation and involvement in political action, and especially how they are influenced 
by geo-political context, i.e., the distinction between Western and Eastern Europe. To achieve 
this goal, data from four waves (independent samples) of the European Social Survey, collected 
in 19 (wave 1) to 26 (wave 4) European countries
1
 are analyzed, including data of over 175,000 
respondents in total. Although previous studies have shed some light on the present issues, 
various methodological issues may hamper the generalizability of their findings. 
With respect to the relationship between Openness and political orientation in Western 
and Eastern Europe, previous studies have analyzed data of only a single Eastern European 
country (i.e., Van Hiel et al, 2000, included only a Polish sample), or a limited sample of Eastern 
European countries (i.e., Thorisdottir et al., 2007, included only samples from the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), which does not seem be truly representative of 
Eastern-Europe. Moreover, in the study of Thorisdottir et al. (2007), the Openness measure 
consisted of only two items from the Schwartz Value questionnaire (PVQ), thus only capturing a 
very limited part of the Openness dimension. To account for these limitations, the present study 
analyzed data from the four consecutive ESS waves, which contain data from four, seven, eight, 
and twelve Eastern European countries, respectively, including former USSR states. Importantly, 
                                                 
1
 Data from Turkey and Israel were not included in the present study, because their status as European countries is 
debatable.     
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by analyzing independent data from all four waves, we wanted to avoid that our findings might 
be overly influenced by particular wave characteristics (i.e., which countries are included) or 
momentary political situations (e.g. the ‘Orange revolution’ in the Ukraine from late November 
2004 to January 2005).  Analyzing the four different waves, each including data of a different set 
of countries, collected at different times, will minimize such wave-specific biases and should 
enable us to detect stable effects.  
A second improvement pertains to the measurement of Openness. In particular, we used 
the equation recently devised by Verkasalo, Lönnqvist, Lipsanen, and Helkema (2009) to assess 
the broad Openness construct, based on all PVQ items. This measure and equation have been 
elaborately validated by Verkasalo et al. (2009) across European countries using the ESS data. 
The second research question pertained to the relationship between Openness and 
political activism. We were especially interested in whether Openness is positively associated 
with political activism. In contrast with previous research (i.e., Curtin et al., 2010), our measure 
of political activism was devoid of any political content, allowing to investigate the effects of 
Openness on political activism in left-wing as well as right-wing citizens. Moreover, we 
distinguished between conventional and unconventional forms of activism. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
The European Social Survey is a cross-sectional biannual survey covering more than 30 
countries. In each country, a representative sample of the adult (15 years and older) population 
was collected by individual face-to-face interviews. For the present study, we analyzed data from 
the first four waves (collected in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008). Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics.  
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Measures 
Left-right political orientation. Participants placed themselves on a single left-right 
continuum, ranging from 0 (extreme left-wing) to 10 (extreme right-wing). This self-placement 
technique to measure political orientation has been widely used and is considered a valid and 
reliable measure of general political orientation (see Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2009; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). 
Openness. Participants completed the 21-item version of the PVQ (Schwartz et al., 2001) 
with three items tapping into Universalism, and two items measuring each of the other values: 
Benevolence, Conformity, Tradition, Security, Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and 
Self-direction. The PVQ is based on descriptions of different persons, whose goals, aspirations 
and wishes are characterized in two sentences. A sample item from the Self-Direction value is: 
‘‘Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own 
original way.” The respondents answer the question ‘‘how much like you is this person’’ by 
using a six-point scale ranging from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all). All items 
were reverse scored, so that the higher the numbers, the stronger the agreement with the item. 
Using the responses on all 21 values items, a single Openness score was calculated based on 
Verkasalo et al.’s (2009) equation2.  
Activism. Based on previous work on political participation (e.g. Sabucedo & Arce, 1991; 
van der Meer & van Ingen, 2009), we distinguished between conventional and unconventional 
forms of political activism. Conventional activism was measured by three indicators: contacting 
a politician or government official, working in a political party or action group, and wearing or 
displaying a campaign badge or sticker. Unconventional activism was also measured by three 
                                                 
2
 Since with the original equation of Verkasalo et al. (2009), high scores represent low Openness, we reversed the signs within the equation. The 
intercept is accordingly set to 109.5331 to rescale to a mean of 100.  
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indicators: signing a petition, taking part in a lawful public demonstration, and boycotting certain 
products. For each action, respondents indicated whether they had undertaken such action or not 
during the last 12 months. Principal Components Analyses with Oblimin Rotation in each data 
wave supported this proposed two-dimensional structure, with rotated eigenvalues ranging 
between 1.59 and 1.78, and a total explained variance ranging between 50.7 and 51.7 %. The 
indicators of activism loaded primarily on the relevant component (average loading = .67). We 
constructed two scores, one for conventional and one for unconventional activism by adding the 
responses, so that respondents’ scores could range from 0 (never been involved in any of these 
actions) to 3 (having been involved in three activities). Hence, higher scores indicated stronger 
political activism. 
East-West distinction. To make a straightforward distinction between Eastern and 
Western Europe, we distinguished between countries that have been under communist regime 
after WWII (i.e., at the eastern side of the Iron Curtain) and countries that have not been under 
Soviet influence. 
Results 
We examined to what extent political orientation and activism were predicted by 
Openness. In order to demonstrate the consistency of our findings and because the four ESS 
waves comprise different countries, analyses were conducted for each wave separately, using the 
weighting procedure recommended by the ESS Technical Reports (e.g., Jowell & the Central 
Coordinating Team, 2009). We conducted multi-level analyses in order to account for the nested 
nature of our data (respondents are nested within countries) and control for country-specific 
variation (i.e., variation not related to the East-West distinction). More specifically, full random 
coefficients regression analyses with country as a level 2 grouping variable were tested. After 
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adjusting for the effects of demographic variables
3
, we investigated to what extent differences in 
left-right political orientation and unconventional and conventional activism are predicted by 
individual-level Openness (grand mean centered), the country-level predictor Eastern-Western 
Europe (effects coded), and the cross-level interaction between Openness and the East-West 
distinction. We report the estimated fixed effects for random intercept models
4
, which allow for 
between-country differences of the intercepts of the effect of Openness on the dependent 
variable. 
Openness as a predictor of left-right orientation 
 In Table 2, the estimated fixed effects are reported for each of the four samples. Left-
right political orientation was significantly associated with the demographic variables: younger 
individuals, women, and those with more years of education generally placed themselves more at 
the left side of the political spectrum.  
We found significant (negative) main effects of Openness on left-right political 
orientation in three of the four waves, but these effects were further qualified by the interaction 
with the East-West distinction. Simple slope analyses using the computational tools provided by 
Preacher, Curran, and Bauer (2006) indicated a considerable, significant effect of Openness on 
political orientation in Western Europe in all samples, bs between -.037 and -.035, SEs <.003, ps 
< .001 (see also Figure 1). However, in Eastern Europe, three out of four samples demonstrated a 
significant reversed effect of Openness on left-right orientation, bs between .006 and .013, SEs< 
.003, ps < .05, indicating that Open individuals were more inclined to place themselves on the 
                                                 
3
 Age, years of education, and gender (all standardized) were included as demographic variables in the fixed effects 
model. Household income was not available for a number of countries in the ESS files, particularly for the 2006 
wave. Analyzing the data while additionally adjusting for income however did not meaningfully change the results. 
4
 We also tested models including both a random country-level intercept as well as random slopes to allow between-
country random effects on the slope of Openness. However, these random country-specific effects were not the main 
focus of our analyses and introducing random slopes failed to significantly change the fit of the model (-2 Log 
Likelihood) in the majority of our analyses. For reasons of conciseness, we therefore report the estimated fixed 
effects for the random intercept model only. 
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right-wing side of the political continuum. In the 2006 sample, the effect was weaker and the 
slope of Openness had the same directionality as in Western Europe, b = -.004, SE = .002, p 
<.05.  
We also compared the association between Openness and left-right placement in Eastern 
and Western Europe for those socialized after the fall of communism (born in 1977 or later) with 
those who were socialized during the era of communist regimes in Eastern Europe (born in 1976 
or earlier).  Random coefficients analyses on the data of participants born in 1977 or later 
indicated that respondents in Eastern Europe who were socialized in the post-communism era 
demonstrate similar patterns of association between Openness and left-right political orientation 
as their Western counterparts (i.e., Openness being associated with left-wing political 
orientation), although the associations are weaker (bs in Western Europe between -.043 and - 
.029, SEs <.004, ps < .001; bs in Eastern Europe between -.024 and -.017, SEs < .060, ps < .05 
except in the 2002 wave, b = .004, SE = .010, ns). However, for respondents in Eastern Europe 
who were socialized in the communist era (born before 1977), the link between Openness and 
left-right self placement is either absent (2002 and 2006 waves), bs = -.002 and .006, SEs < .007, 
ns, or reversed (2004 and 2008 waves), bs = .011 and .018, SE < .005, ps < .05, whereas their 
Western European counterparts consistently displayed a significant association between 
Openness and a more left-wing orientation (bs in Western Europe between -.037 and - .034, SEs 
<.002, ps < .001). 
Openness as a predictor of unconventional and conventional activism 
 Tables 3 and 4 report the estimated fixed effects predicting unconventional and 
conventional activism, respectively. Given that Openness was differently associated with left-
right political orientation dependent on the geo-political context, we also included individuals’ 
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left-right orientation, its interactions with Openness and the cross-level interactions with the 
East-West distinction in our analyses. 
 For unconventional activism (see Table 3), we consistently found that older individuals, 
more educated respondents and females tend to participate more in unconventional activism. 
Significant and consistent main effects for Openness and left-right orientation were further 
qualified by significant two-way interactions between Openness and the East-West distinction 
and between left-right political orientation and the East-West distinction, as well as a consistent 
three-way interaction between Openness, left-right political Orientation and East-West 
distinction in the four waves. In order to interpret these three-way interactions, we further 
conducted simple slope analyses where we looked at the effect of Openness on unconventional 
activism among Leftist (1SD below) and Rightist (1SD above the mean) respondents in Eastern 
and Western Europe and these results are included in Figure 2. Most notable is that in Western 
Europe, among people who place themselves on the left side of the political continuum, 
Openness is particularly predictive of participation in unconventional activism, bs between .019 
and .026, SEs = 001, p < .001, whereas in Eastern Europe, Openness had somewhat weaker or 
even a non-significant association with left-wing unconventional activism, bs between .003 
and.004, SEs < .002, ps <.05 or ns (in the 2002 wave).  In Eastern Europe, the association 
between Openness and unconventional activism among those on the right-wing side was more 
pronounced, bs between .005 and .008, SEs < .002, p <.001 (except the 2004 sample, p<.01) than 
among those on the left side, but comparable to the association between Openness and 
unconventional activism among right-wing West Europeans, bs between .005 and .010, SEs < 
.001, ps < .001. 
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Conventional activism (see Table 4) was associated again with the demographic 
variables, showing the same pattern as unconventional activism, with the exception of an 
inversed Gender effect, indicating that men reported more ‘party’ activism than women. 
Openness was significantly and consistently related to conventional activism, whereas left-right 
political orientation was not consistently associated with party activism. The main effect of 
Openness was further qualified by a significant two-way interaction with political orientation in 
three out of the four waves, as well as a significant three-way interaction in all four waves. 
Additional simple slope analyses (see Figure 2) indicated that, in line with the previous 
analysis of unconventional activism, in Western Europe, Openness is particularly predictive of 
left-wing conventional activism, bs between .008 and .012, SEs < .001, p < .001, but somewhat 
less predictive of conventional activism among right-wing adherents, bs between .000 and .004, 
SE = .001, ns in 2004 and 2008 samples, p < .001 in the 2004 and 2006 samples. However, in 
Eastern Europe, Openness is about equally predictive for conventional activism in left-wing, bs 
between .003 and .005, SEs < .002, ps < .01, and right-wing respondents, bs between .004 and 
.008, SEs < .002, ps < .01. 
 Finally, the unstandardized regression coefficients of the Openness effect reported in 
Tables 3 and 4 also indicate that although Openness is associated with both unconventional and 
conventional activism overall, its effect is considerably stronger for unconventional than for 
conventional activism. 
Discussion 
The present study provided a comprehensive investigation of the relationships between 
Openness and political orientation and activism in Europe. Analyses were conducted on data of 
the first four waves of the European Social Survey, including large representative samples in 19 
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(wave 1) to 26 (wave 4) European countries. Overall, the results convincingly demonstrated a 
robust positive relationship between Openness and left-wing political orientation in Western 
Europe, whereas in Eastern Europe, this relationship was generally weaker and even reversed. 
With regard to the relationship between Openness and political activism, we obtained significant 
positive relationships for both conventional and unconventional activism, but Openness was 
clearly most strongly related to the latter form of activism. Overall, Openness and activism were 
associated in Western and Eastern Europe and in both left- and right wing respondents, but some 
notable differences also emerged. In the remainder we first elaborate on the relationship between 
Openness and political orientation, and subsequently we focus on the relationship between 
Openness and activism.  
The relationship between Openness and political attitudes across cultures 
Whereas across the four waves, Openness showed a strong positive relationship with left-
wing political orientation in Western Europe, this relationship was modestly negative in Eastern 
Europe in three out of four waves. We argue that this different (i.e., opposite) overall relationship 
may be explained by the different post-World War II political history and socialization in these 
two European regions. In particular, in democratic, industrialized countries in Western Europe 
and Northern America, a left-wing political orientation generally reflects progressive attitudes 
aimed at societal change (see, Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Not surprisingly 
then, people high in Openness who value novelty, unconstrained by tradition, find left-wing 
ideology attractive when living in the Western European political context. Conversely, most 
Eastern European citizens have spent their formative years under a communist regime and have 
thus been socialized in a totalitarian and left-wing ideological system. In Eastern Europe, left-
wing political attitudes therefore reflect an old, ‘conservative’ political system imposed by an 
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authoritarian regime, and open people therefore seem to be more attracted to right-wing 
ideology. In other words, which political view is considered to be conservative depends on the 
culture of reference (see also, Altemeyer, 1996).  
Communism has been described by Rokeach (1973) as an ideology in terms of high 
importance of the value ‘egalitarianism’ and low importance of the value ‘freedom’. The 
political system in Western Europe shares to some degree the importance it attaches to 
egalitarianism, evidenced by for example, smaller income inequalities compared to the US (e.g., 
Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002). However, in contrast to communist regimes, freedom is also 
highly valued in Western European democracies. Open people seem to be attracted to left-wing 
principles (only) in political systems that incorporate egalitarianism and freedom (i.e., in 
Western Europe), but left-wing principles lose their appeal to open people who have experienced 
left-wing regimes that emphasize egalitarianism but downgrade freedom (i.e., in Eastern 
Europe). Hence, it seems that a political system’s emphasis on freedom, rather than its emphasis 
on egalitarianism, provides to individuals a context in which a positive relationship between 
Openness and left-wing political orientation develops.  
Importantly, Communism as a political system collapsed in Eastern Europe about 20 
years ago and the transition to democracy and free-market trade has dominated the political 
reality of the younger generations living there. Given the recent shift of the political system in 
Eastern European countries toward the Western European template, the relationship between 
Openness and political orientation within the younger generations should be more similar to the 
relationship found in Western Europe. Our findings corroborated this expectation showing a 
positive and significant relationship between Openness and left-wing political orientation for the 
younger generations in Eastern Europe. These findings thus support the idea that with a new 
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political context, the personality-ideology association in former communist countries slowly shifts 
towards the structure that is found in the West (see also, Duriez et al., 2005). Overall, it can 
therefore be concluded that rather than being a universal psychological determinant of left-wing 
political orientation (see, McCrae, 1996), the influence of Openness on political orientation 
depends on the dominant political system in which an individual has been socialized.  
Openness and political activism 
Whereas the relationship between Openness and political orientation has been a topic of 
interest for many years, research on the relationship between Openness and activism is relatively 
recent. The literature on political activism has mostly adopted a ‘person-within-group’ 
perspective, for example focusing on the importance of group identification to explain political 
activism (e.g., Sturmer & Simon, 2004). Attention for broad personality traits as antecedents of 
political activism has, however, been largely absent. A notable exception is the recent study by 
Curtin et al. (2010) who revealed a significant relationship between Openness and left-wing 
activism. The present study extended this new research field, providing a more comprehensive 
picture on the role of Openness in political activism. First, we were able to show that the 
relationship between Openness and activism is not restricted to left-wing political activism, but 
also emerges for people endorsing a right-wing political ideology. Second, the present study 
distinguished between conventional or party activism and unconventional activism. As expected, 
our results demonstrated that Openness is most strongly associated with unconventional forms of 
activism, at least in Western Europe.  
However, the overall engagement in a particular form of activism as well as its 
association with Openness depends on the geo-political context and the individual’s political 
orientation. In Western Europe, people who self-identified with left-wing ideology were more 
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involved in political activism and showed the strongest relationships between Openness and 
activism, especially unconventional activism. For right-wing respondents, the influence of 
Openness on unconventional activism was weaker and even virtually absent for conventional 
activism. In Eastern Europe, Openness was somewhat less predictive of activism, and differences 
between left and right and between conventional and unconventional activism were also less 
prominent. Most remarkable, however, was the reversed interaction pattern with political 
orientation we found in Eastern Europe. People who self-identified with right-wing ideology 
were generally more involved in activism and showed stronger associations between Openness 
and activism. Overall, these findings seem to indicate that role of Openness in political activism 
should not just be considered in terms of the individual’s political orientation, but also in terms 
of society’s traditional-historical political orientation and policy. 
Finally, it can be noted that, whereas unconventional activism seems relatively 
widespread in Western Europe, it is much less common in Eastern Europe. Possibly, most 
Eastern European citizens, being raised in a repressive totalitarian one-party regime, may still be 
inclined to avoid such ‘hazardous’ acts because they have been ‘conditioned’ to do so. On the 
other hand, it can be argued that Eastern European citizens have been relatively unfamiliar with 
conventional activism as well. Indeed, although Communist regimes encouraged mass 
participation in political party activities, this participation was not geared towards achieving any 
influence over political decision making or policy change. Hence, trying to influence politics by 
directly contacting politicians, working for different political parties or action groups and 
involvement in election campaigns represent relatively new tactics in Eastern Europe. For 
Eastern European citizens, these strategies may be just as ‘unconventional’, rendering the 
distinction between unconventional and conventional (party) activism less meaningful compared 
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to Western Europe. Indeed, our findings indicate that, in contrast to Western Europe, 
unconventional and conventional activism are about equally (un)common and equally influenced 
by Openness in Eastern Europe. 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
The present study analyzed data from four waves of the European Social Survey and as 
such provided an investigation of the relationship between Openness and political orientation and 
activism, unprecedented in terms of sample size and representativeness, covering most European 
countries. However, some limitations of using the ESS waves for the present research can be 
noted as well. First, the ESS data only allow for measuring Openness through values. Although  
this approach has been common in research (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs, et al., 2005; Duriez & 
Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008; Thorisdottir et al., 2007), the Openness construct 
measured through values may show imperfect fit to the Openness personality construct in terms 
of the Five-Factor Model. Future research may aim to replicate the present findings with FFM 
measures of Openness. Moreover, especially with regard to the prediction of activism, it may be 
fruitful to also investigate the potential role of other personality factors, such as Extraversion. 
A second limitation pertains to the measurement of political orientation by a single self-
placement item. This self-placement scale is well-established as a valid and reliable measure of 
general political orientation (see e.g., Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Thorisdottir et al., 2007), 
being highly related to more elaborate multi-item measures of political orientation and yielding 
comparable effects (see e.g., Roets & Van Hiel, 2009). Most importantly in the present context, 
the measure is universally meaningful in different geo-political contexts. However, the measure 
does not tap into political orientation regarding more specific (e.g., cultural and economic) issues 
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separately (see Duriez et al., 2005). Future cross-cultural research may aim to corroborate 
Openness effects on political orientation in these more specific domains. A third limitation, 
related to the second one, pertains to political activism also being captured by a limited number 
of items and the use of such brief scales might have deflated the magnitude of the obtained 
relationships. Nevertheless, taking into account insights from previous research within specific 
countries, we believe that the present large-scale study covering most European countries 
provides an accurate picture of the general role of Openness in political orientation and activism. 
Finally, in the present study, we compared Western to Eastern Europe because of their 
undeniable differences in political history. Moreover, these differences can be straightforwardly 
mapped in geographical terms, thereby providing an objective way to distinguish between these 
two regions in the ESS data. This focus on the historical-political context may also provide a 
useful basis for further cross-cultural research aiming to advance our understanding of the role of 
individual traits in political orientation and activism in other, yet-unexplored parts of the world. 
For example, in various Southern American countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, most 
of the adult population has been socialized under right-wing military regimes, and only relatively 
recently democratic governments have been installed. Most citizens of China and Cuba, on the 
other hand, have only known a totalitarian left-wing (i.e., communist) government. An 
interesting question arising here is whether our rationale about the effects of historical-political 
context in Western and Eastern Europe can be extended to predict the relationship between 
Openness and political orientation and activism in these non-European countries as well. In 
particular, it may be hypothesized that in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, Openness will be 
positively associated with left-wing political orientation, whereas this relationship might be 
negative in Cuba and China. Also, in the former countries, one might expect Openness to inspire 
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particularly left-wing activism, whereas in the latter countries, Openness may be primarily 
associated with right-wing activism. 
It may be argued that our conceptual focus on the historical-political context in Europe 
and the resulting distinction between two vast regions might obscure potential differences 
between smaller clusters of countries based on other criteria. Indeed, Hofstede (1980) and the 
GLOBE-project (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) have suggested a number of 
smaller country-clusters in Western Europe, which can be identified based on ‘cultural values 
dimensions’. In contrast to our conceptual distinction between Western and Eastern Europe, 
these smaller clusters have been delineated by a data-driven approach, aggregating individual 
responses of (non-representative) samples within each country to obtain country-level indices on 
five (Hofstede) or nine (GLOBE) dimensions of cultural values, such as Power Distance and 
Future Orientation. These dimensions of cultural values were developed within the domain of 
Industrial and Organizational psychology and research therefore primarily focused on their 
impact at an organizational level. Nevertheless, these dimensions can provide useful insights at a 
societal level as well. Future research may therefore want to investigate the role of each of the 
cultural value dimensions with regard to the effect of Openness on political orientation and 
activism at the individual level and assess potential differences between more fine-grained 
country-clusters.  
 
Conclusion 
The present study analyzed the relationship between Openness and political orientation and 
activism across Europe. Openness demonstrated substantial and robust positive relationships 
with left-wing political orientation in Western European countries, whereas this relationship was 
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considerably weaker and even reversed in Eastern Europe. Moreover, Openness showed to be 
especially relevant for left-wing political activism in Western Europe, whereas in Eastern 
Europe, it was slightly more associated with right-wing activism. It can therefore be concluded 
that the role of Openness as a ‘political variable’ is highly dependent on the geo-political 
(historical) context.  
25 
 
References 
 
Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian spectre. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality”. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology (Vol., 30, pp. 47-92). San Diego: Academic Press. 
Caprara G. V., Barbaranelli C., & Zimbardo P. G (1999). Personality profiles and political 
parties. Political Psychology, 20, 175–197. 
Cohrs, J. C., Moschner, B., Maes, J., & Kielmann, S. (2005). The motivational bases of right-
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Relations to values and attitudes in 
the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1425-
1434.    
Curtin, N., Stewart, A. J., & Duncan, L. E. (2010). What makes the political personal? Openness, 
personal political salience, and activism. Journal of Personality, 78, 943-968. 
Duncan, L. E., & Stewart, A. J. (2007). Personal political salience: The role of personality in 
collective identity and action. Political Psychology, 28, 143-164. 
Duriez, B., & Van Hiel, A. (2002). The march of modern fascism. A comparison of social 
dominance orientation and authoritarianism. Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 
1199-1213. 
Duriez, B., Van Hiel, A. & Kossowska, M. (2005). Authoritarianism and social dominance in 
Western and Eastern Europe: The importance of the sociopolitical context and of political 
interest and involvement. Political Psychology, 26, 299-320. 
Feather, N. T., & McKee, I. R. (2008). Values and prejudice: Predictors of attitudes towards 
Australian Aborigines. Australian Journal of Psychology, 60, 80-90. 
26 
 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P., & Gupta, V. (2004). Culture, Leadership, 
and Organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Inglehart, R. & Klingemann, H.D. (1976). Party identification, ideological preference and the 
left-right dimension among Western mass publics. In I. Budge, I. Crewe & D. Fadie (Eds.), 
Party identification and beyond (pp. 243–273). New York: John Wiley. 
Jost, J., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Excfeptions that prove the rule – 
Using a theory of motivated social cognition to account for ideological incongruities and 
political anomalies: A reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003). Psychological Bulletin, 129, 
383-393. 
Jowell, R., & the Central Coordinating Team (2009). European Social Survey 2006/2007: 
Technical Report.  London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University. 
McCrae, R. R. (1996). Social Consequences of Experiential Openness. Psychological Bulletin 
120, 323-37. 
Milanovic, B. & Yitzhaki, S. (2002). Decomposing the world income distribution: Does the 
world have a middle class? Review of Income and Wealth, 48, 155-178. 
Orelien, J. G.; Edwards, L.  J.(2008). Fixed-effect variable selection in linear mixed models 
using R-2 statistics. Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 52, 1896-1907.  
Patterson, T. E. (2002). The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of Uncertainty. 
New York: Alfred Knopf. 
Pattyn, S., Van Hiel, A., Dhont, K. & Onraet, E. (2010). Stripping the political cynic: A 
psychological exploration of the concept of political cynicism. Manuscript under review.  
27 
 
Peterson, B. E., Smirles, K. A. & Wentworth, P. A. (1997). Generativity and authoritarianism: 
Implications for personality, political involvement, and parenting. Journal of Personality and 
social Psychology, 72, 1202-1216. 
Preacher, K. J., Curran, P. J., & Bauer, D. J. (2006). Computational tools for probing interaction 
effects in multiple linear regression, multilevel modeling, and latent curve analysis. Journal 
of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 31, 437-448. 
Riemann, R., Grubich, C., Hempel, S., Mergl, S., & Richter, M. (1993). Personality and attitudes 
towards current political topics. Personality and Individual Differences, 15, 313-321.  
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press. 
Roets, A. & Van Hiel, A. (2009). The ideal politician: Impact of voters’ ideology. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 46, 60-65. 
Sabucedo, J.M. & Arce, C. (1991). Types of political participation: a multidimensional analysis. 
European Journal of Political Research, 20, 93-102.   
Schwartz, S. H., & Boehnke, K. (2004). Evaluating the structure of human values with 
confirmatory factor analysis. Journal of Research in Personality, 38, 230–255.  
Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances 
and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social psychology 25, 1–65.  
Sibley C. G. & Duckitt, J. (2008). Personality and prejudice: A meta-analysis and theoretical 
review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12, 248-279. 
Thorisdottir, H., Jost, J. T., Liviatan, I. & Shrout, P. E. (2007). Psychological needs and values 
underlying left-right political orientation: Cross-national evidence from Eastern and Western 
Europe. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71, 175-203. 
28 
 
van der Meer, T., & van Ingen, E. (2009). Schools of Democracy? Disentangling the 
Relationship between Civic Participation and Political Action in 17 European Countries. 
European Journal of Political Research , 48, 281-308. 
Van Hiel, A., & Mervielde, I. (1996). Personality and current political beliefs. Psychologica 
Belgica, 36, 211–216. 
Van Hiel, A., Kossowska, M., & Mervielde, I. (2000). The relationship between openness to 
experience and political ideology. Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 741–751. 
Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J.-E., Lipsanen, E, & Helkema K. (2009). European Norms and 
equations for a two dimensional presentation of values as measured with Schwartz’s 21-item 
portrait values questionnaire. European Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 780-792. 
 
29 
 
  
Table 1.  
Description of countries included in each sample and descriptive statistics averaged over data 
waves. 
 2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
8 
net 
sample 
size 
Gender
% 
females 
Age Openness Placement on left 
right scale 
Unconventional 
Activism 
Conventional 
Activism 
       Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Bulgaria   x x 1807 58 47.94 17.30 95.80 9.39 4.63 2.66 0.12 0.41 0.10 0.41 
Croatia    x 1444 57 42.82 16.80 96.24 9.21 5.29 2.48 0.47 0.82 0.17 0.52 
Czech 
Republic 
x x  x 2099 51 46.09 17.24 96.92 8.74 5.48 2.44 0.27 0.59 0.26 0.54 
Estonia  x x x 1721 58 46.93 19.44 99.30 9.08 5.25 1.97 0.13 0.41 0.17 0.46 
Hungary x x x x 1557 55 46.52 18.36 98.21 8.22 5.22 2.38 0.14 0.45 0.15 0.43 
Latvia    x 1980 62 47.27 18.58 97.01 8.90 5.79 2.51 0.17 0.48 0.17 0.46 
Poland x x x x 1789 52 43.32 18.56 94.76 8.46 5.52 2.27 0.13 0.41 0.13 0.43 
Romania    x 2115 56 42.21 16.65 95.31 8.01 5.61 2.66 0.10 0.37 0.21 0.56 
Russian 
Federation 
 x x 2461 58 43.88 18.40 94.80 9.55 5.22 2.02 0.15 0.47 0.14 0.43 
Slovakia  x x x 1653 54 44.23 17.82 94.98 7.80 4.92 2.37 0.34 0.61 0.14 0.43 
Slovenia x x x x 1419 54 45.68 18.79 99.06 8.86 4.78 2.36 0.17 0.46 0.19 0.50 
Ukraine  x x x 1959 61 46.66 18.07 94.37 9.07 5.61 2.38 0.20 0.48 0.21 0.52 
                 
Austria x x x  2298 53 41.50 16.98 102.56 10.80 4.67 1.94 0.51 0.77 0.38 0.71 
Belgium x x x x 1786 51 45.38 18.48 101.10 9.11 4.89 1.99 0.47 0.73 0.28 0.59 
Cyprus   x x 1100 51 44.48 17.48 96.57 7.90 5.07 3.05 0.16 0.48 0.36 0.76 
Danmark x x x x 1524 50 47.88 17.72 104.01 10.14 5.43 2.06 0.64 0.79 0.31 0.60 
Finland x x x x 2028 52 47.27 18.74 101.48 9.33 5.70 2.02 0.59 0.75 0.41 0.68 
France x x x x 1841 53 46.54 18.06 103.30 9.95 4.77 2.33 0.76 0.93 0.31 0.61 
Germany x x x x 2823 50 47.23 17.70 101.73 10.05 4.60 1.82 0.65 0.83 0.22 0.53 
Greece x x  x 2346 55 45.21 17.62 94.93 7.57 5.49 2.19 0.19 0.51 0.21 0.56 
Iceland  x   566 53 43.50 18.26 105.97 10.05 5.09 2.16 0.92 0.91 0.79 0.91 
Ireland x x x  1995 55 43.94 17.67 98.56 9.64 5.30 1.80 0.43 0.73 0.35 0.64 
Netherlands x x x x 1977 54 46.49 17.12 102.42 8.65 5.21 2.02 0.35 0.63 0.22 0.52 
Norway x x x x 1773 48 45.63 17.56 100.83 9.54 5.24 2.05 0.69 0.84 0.54 0.76 
Portugal x x x x 2037 58 47.35 19.04 98.38 8.04 4.95 2.08 0.12 0.41 0.14 0.45 
Spain x x x x 1950 51 45.66 18.88 97.49 9.51 4.48 2.03 0.53 0.84 0.26 0.60 
Sweden x x x x 1923 50 46.81 18.81 104.14 9.42 5.11 2.28 0.85 0.84 0.34 0.64 
Switzerland x x x x 1949 53 45.88 17.90 103.92 9.92 4.97 1.91 0.73 0.86 0.28 0.59 
United 
Kingdom 
x x x x 2161 52 46.25 18.45 100.78 9.34 5.06 1.75 0.66 0.80 0.27 0.56 
Note: x = data included in analysis for a particular wave. 
30 
 
Table 2:  
Estimated Fixed Effects and Standard Errors from random and fixed effects multilevel models 
predicting Left-Right Self Placement in four independent samples. 
Estimated fixed effects 2002   2004   2006   2008   
 b SE  b SE  b SE  b SE  
Intercept 5.182 .131 *** 5.220 .101 *** 5.155 .118 *** 5.233 .060 *** 
Education -.014 .016   -.049 .014 ** -.038 .013 ** -.055 .012 *** 
Age .098 .016 *** .077 .015 *** -.017 .014   -.029 .012 * 
Gender -.053 .014 *** -.050 .013 *** -.025 .012 * -.003 .011   
Openness -.014 .002 *** -.014 .002 *** -.020 .001 *** -.011 .001 *** 
EastWest -.178 .131   -.265 .101 * -.199 .118   -.248 .060 ** 
Openness x EastWest -.021 .002 *** -.020 .002 *** -.016 .001 *** -.024 .001 *** 
R²1   .12   .17   .07   .10 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, R²1= marginal pseudo R² statistics (Orelien & Edwards, 2008). 
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Table 3:  
Estimated Fixed Effects and Standard Errors from random and fixed effects multilevel models 
predicting Unconventional Activism and Conventional Activism in four independent samples. 
 2002   2004   2006   2008   
 b SE  b SE  b SE  b SE  
 UNCONVENTIONAL ACTIVISM 
Intercept .395 .057 *** .400 .049 *** .341 .036 *** .353 .027 *** 
Education .163 .006 *** .159 .005 *** .138 .004 *** .123 .004 *** 
Age .013 .006 * .042 .006 *** .044 .005 *** .047 .004 *** 
Gender .016 .005 ** .030 .005 *** .020 .004 *** .017 .004 *** 
Openness .010 .001 *** .010 .001 *** .009 .001 *** .010 .000 *** 
EastWest .160 .057 * .139 .049 * .156 .036 ** .124 .027 *** 
Left-right -.018 .004 *** -.008 .003 ** -.016 .002 *** -.016 .002 *** 
O x East-West .005 .001 *** .004 .001 *** .004 .000 *** .006 .000 *** 
O x Left-right -.002 .000 *** -.001 .000 * -.002 .000 *** -.002 .000 *** 
EastWest *Leftright -.033 .004 *** -.038 .003 *** -.029 .002 *** -.016 .002 *** 
O x EastWest *Leftright -.003 .000 *** -.002 .000 *** -.002 .000 *** -.003 .000 *** 
R²1   .15   .13   .16   .16 
 CONVENTIONAL ACTIVISM 
Intercept .292 .028 *** .253 .025 *** .233 .020 *** .212 .012 *** 
Education .098 .004 *** .082 .004 *** .073 .003 *** .067 .003 *** 
Age .048 .005 *** .038 .004 *** .052 .004 *** .047 .003 *** 
Gender -.030 .004 *** -.019 .004 *** -.020 .003 *** -.017 .003 *** 
Openness .005 .001 *** .006 .001 *** .005 .000 *** .005 .000 *** 
EastWest .014 .028   .031 .025   .030 .020   .018 .012   
Left-right -.006 .003 * .007 .002 * .002 .002   -.002 .001   
O x East-West .001 .001   -.001 .000   .001 .000 * .000 .000   
O x Left-right -.002 .000 *** .000 .000   -.001 .000 *** -.001 .000 *** 
EastWest *Leftright -.009 .003 ** -.016 .002 *** -.016 .002 *** -.003 .001 * 
O x EastWest *Leftright -.001 .000 *** -.001 .000 *** -.001 .000 *** -.001 .000 *** 
R²1   .17   .26   .05   .17 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, R²1= marginal pseudo R² statistics. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Effects of Openness (1SD above and below the mean) on Left-Right Selfplacement in 
Eastern and Western Europe in four samples. 
 
Figure 2: Effects of Openness (1SD above and below the mean) on Unconventional  Activism 
(top four panels) and Unconventional Activism (bottom four panels) for politically left and right 
oriented individuals (1SD above and below the mean) in Eastern and Western Europe in four 
samples. 
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